It was on this day in 1994 that a plane carrying the President of Rwanda was shot down as it was returning him to the Rwandan capital, Kigali. The incident triggered the start of a massive blood-letting. I think about that day and the horror that followed often. And I find it particularly horrific that once again the world community is standing by and watching similar bloodshed in the Darfur region of Sudan.
For some three years now, world leaders, including US officials, have said “urgent” action must be taken. Yet the killings continue. This is not, to me, wholly unexpected. On this anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, it is appropriate to remember the international community could have minimized the scope of the bloodshed in 1994. Yet it chose not to.
From Kigali in September of1994, I reported that authorities at UN headquarters in New York had refused to approve key military actions by peacekeepers that might have prevented the eruption of large-scale ethnic and political violence:
Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire is now gone from Rwanda. But as the original UN commander in Rwanda, he could scarcely conceal his bitterness when asked at his final news conference in Kigali to assess the international community's response to the Rwandan crisis: “we're so late it's not funny . . ."
His frustration is perhaps more understandable in light of new disclosures by senior UN sources. These sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, say that late last year and early this year -- months before the mass violence that claimed more than half-a-million lives -- General Dallaire proposed taking actions that many officials, both Rwandan and foreign, say could have minimized the extent of the slaughter.
The sources say General Dallaire had detailed information about the location of the weapons eventually used by extremist Hutus against members of the Tutsi minority and politically moderate Hutus who were interested in reconciliation. They say he also had information about how the weapons were being distributed and where civilian Hutu militia were being trained to kill. The sources say he even knew which Rwandan political figures had been targeted for death.
Rwanda’s new authorities say he was not alone in knowing these kind of things. Paul Kagame is the one-time rebel commander who is now the country's vice president and defense minister. He says everyone in the international community knew what was going on:
“The international community as a whole knew. Every ambassador here, from whichever European or American country knew. So there is nobody who denies having prior knowledge. Everybody up to the Secretary General of theUN, yes, that one I'm 100 percent sure.”
One senior UN official who was in Kigali last year says that General Dallaire -- in the official's words -- "wanted to get the arms, seize the arms." But the official says UN headquarters in New York vetoed his recommendations, and warned the General he would be exceeding his authority if he tried to intervene.
Says the source -- "he was dissuaded, he was cautioned, he was instructed it was not in his mandate."
The original UN mandate for peacekeeping in Rwanda called on the more than two-thousand troops who were deployed in the country last year to "contribute" to security in the capital, Kigali. It also called on them to "monitor" observance of a ceasefire critical to the successful implementation of a power-sharing accord between the then Hutu-led government and the mainly Tutsi rebel Rwandese Patriotic Front.
In addition, the mandate authorized peacekeepers to "investigate" certain incidents and to "assist" in special areas like relief activities. The mandate did not use explicit verbs like "disarm" or "intercede."
But some UN officials say it was a matter of interpretation. They suggest that had it wanted to, the United Nations, with the support of key member countries, could have acted.
Instead, the killings began in earnest last April. And when they did, the United Nations' principal response was to pull out most of the forces it had in Rwanda -- a fact that still galls many Rwandans who survived the holocaust that followed.
But without authorization or the resources to intervene on even a limited scale, General Dallaire did the only thing UN military officials say he could have done -- minimize the possible risk to his soldiers by ordering most of them to withdraw, leaving behind a small force of only about 450, a force that could barely protect itself, let alone prevent the massacres that shocked the world.
For some three years now, world leaders, including US officials, have said “urgent” action must be taken. Yet the killings continue. This is not, to me, wholly unexpected. On this anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, it is appropriate to remember the international community could have minimized the scope of the bloodshed in 1994. Yet it chose not to.
From Kigali in September of1994, I reported that authorities at UN headquarters in New York had refused to approve key military actions by peacekeepers that might have prevented the eruption of large-scale ethnic and political violence:
Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire is now gone from Rwanda. But as the original UN commander in Rwanda, he could scarcely conceal his bitterness when asked at his final news conference in Kigali to assess the international community's response to the Rwandan crisis: “we're so late it's not funny . . ."
His frustration is perhaps more understandable in light of new disclosures by senior UN sources. These sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, say that late last year and early this year -- months before the mass violence that claimed more than half-a-million lives -- General Dallaire proposed taking actions that many officials, both Rwandan and foreign, say could have minimized the extent of the slaughter.
The sources say General Dallaire had detailed information about the location of the weapons eventually used by extremist Hutus against members of the Tutsi minority and politically moderate Hutus who were interested in reconciliation. They say he also had information about how the weapons were being distributed and where civilian Hutu militia were being trained to kill. The sources say he even knew which Rwandan political figures had been targeted for death.
Rwanda’s new authorities say he was not alone in knowing these kind of things. Paul Kagame is the one-time rebel commander who is now the country's vice president and defense minister. He says everyone in the international community knew what was going on:
“The international community as a whole knew. Every ambassador here, from whichever European or American country knew. So there is nobody who denies having prior knowledge. Everybody up to the Secretary General of theUN, yes, that one I'm 100 percent sure.”
One senior UN official who was in Kigali last year says that General Dallaire -- in the official's words -- "wanted to get the arms, seize the arms." But the official says UN headquarters in New York vetoed his recommendations, and warned the General he would be exceeding his authority if he tried to intervene.
Says the source -- "he was dissuaded, he was cautioned, he was instructed it was not in his mandate."
The original UN mandate for peacekeeping in Rwanda called on the more than two-thousand troops who were deployed in the country last year to "contribute" to security in the capital, Kigali. It also called on them to "monitor" observance of a ceasefire critical to the successful implementation of a power-sharing accord between the then Hutu-led government and the mainly Tutsi rebel Rwandese Patriotic Front.
In addition, the mandate authorized peacekeepers to "investigate" certain incidents and to "assist" in special areas like relief activities. The mandate did not use explicit verbs like "disarm" or "intercede."
But some UN officials say it was a matter of interpretation. They suggest that had it wanted to, the United Nations, with the support of key member countries, could have acted.
Instead, the killings began in earnest last April. And when they did, the United Nations' principal response was to pull out most of the forces it had in Rwanda -- a fact that still galls many Rwandans who survived the holocaust that followed.
But without authorization or the resources to intervene on even a limited scale, General Dallaire did the only thing UN military officials say he could have done -- minimize the possible risk to his soldiers by ordering most of them to withdraw, leaving behind a small force of only about 450, a force that could barely protect itself, let alone prevent the massacres that shocked the world.
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