“The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”
He went on to say:
“Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide.”
The reference to Africa naturally triggered my curiosity. Where? What country? How did he hope to pull it off? I began asking my sources, first at the Pentagon, where I was based as a military affairs correspondent.
This took on added urgency after the next day, January 29, 2003, when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld held a news briefing at the Pentagon in which he repeated the claim:

“As the President pointed out, the Iraqi regime ... has the design for a nuclear weapon; it was working on several different methods of enriching uranium, and recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”
My sources in the Africa section of the Pentagon were of no help. But one of my sources in the intelligence business subsequently came to me, saying that because of my known interest in Africa, he had something for me. He said the country in question was Niger and that documents now in the hands of US intelligence spelled out a new deal to sell uranium oxide, known as “yellowcake”, to Iraq. He made clear in response to my questions that there was no indication any yellowcake had in fact been transferred from Niger to Iraq.
Let me be clear, this source came to me after I asked about the Africa connection. He did not, I firmly believe, seek me out to plant what we later learned was fake intelligence. He acted in good faith. Of this, I am confident as he and other Pentagon sources had been quite forthcoming to me on African matters. (I have long believed this was because no one had ever asked questions about sub-Saharan Africa at the Pentagon until I got there and because, as I learned and appreciated, one very nice thing about military personnel is that when asked a question, they answer it to the extent security restrictions allow. They can also make clear in subtle ways if they are under any restrictions imposed on them by political appointees.)
In the meantime, I discovered a State Department Fact Sheet issued on December 19, 2002 which, as best as I can determine, first fingered Niger but which had never been picked up by any news organization and reported on until I noticed.
This document purported to show what it termed “Illustrative Examples of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council,” Iraq’s lengthy reply to US and other allegations about its weapons of mass destruction program. Under the heading “Nuclear Weapons”, the so-called fact sheet charged:
“The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger. Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?”
As we later learned, the charges about Iraq seeking uranium in Africa were false and based on fake documents, probably created by Italian operatives out to make a fast buck. I hold no sympathy for Saddam, but how do you prove an untruth?
My intelligence source did not show me the actual documents and may not have seen them himself, possibly enabling me to see the obvious and now-known flaws that made clear they were fake.
Nonetheless, this source and the others I cross-checked his claims with were highly credible. With careful caveats, I and my editors felt a story could be done as the identification of the country of Niger was news at the time since it had not been publicly identified before.
So several days after the President’s State of the Union address, after completing my initial research, I filed my first story.
In the coming days I will post all my reports on this subject.
One final note: after the Niger connection documents were revealed to be phoney, my main intelligence source at the Pentagon came to me to say there was more evidence besides the fakes now widely called “the Italian Letter” that made the original charge credible or at least the suspicion of a deal plausible. He declined to give me any more information. And I chose to do nothing more on the topic. It was a closed matter as far as I was concerned. We now know there were other cases where false or faulty intelligence was used by the Bush administration to justify military action against Iraq. One cannot help but wonder whether similar activity is now under way vis-à-vis Iran or al-Qaida in Iraq. Fortunately, I believe (and hope) journalists will be much more skeptical this time around.
Here is my first report, dated 2/21/03, less than a month after the President’s State of the Union address. I believe it was the first comprehensive report on the Niger connection. Please note that it includes the observation that there was no evidence that the alleged new transaction was completed.
US and UN officials say the African country of Niger supplied Iraq with a key ingredient for its nuclear program two decades ago and recently agreed secretly to resume those shipments. More in this exclusive report: Last year, the British government released a dossier linking the African continent to Iraq's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. It accused Baghdad of trying to obtain what were termed "significant quantities of uranium from Africa" for its covert nuclear weapons program.

The British document did not identify any African countries. But in December, the US State Department issued a fact sheet of its own, outlining critical omissions in Iraq's latest declaration to the United Nations on its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs.
That fact sheet singled out Niger as a country where Baghdad had tried to procure uranium.
The US statement prompted authorities in Niger to acknowledge Iraq did try to purchase uranium in the 1980s. But they said the country's President at the time (Seyni Kountche) turned down Baghdad's request.
However, US officials say that Iraq did obtain uranium from Niger two decades ago and that three years ago the two countries signed a secret agreement to resume the shipments. The original sales are documented in a 1997 United Nations report submitted to the Security Council by Hans Blix, then Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and currently chief UN weapons inspector for Iraq.
That report, obtained by this reporter, says Iraq received two large shipments from Niger of "yellowcake," a term describing a colorful, concentrated form of uranium ore used in nuclear programs, either for fuel or weapons. One shipment, received inFebruary of 1981, consisted of nearly 140 metric tons of "yellowcake." The second shipment, received in March of 1982, consisted of a nearly identical amount.
The UN report notes that Iraq notified the International Atomic Energy Agency of the first shipment but not the second.
Independently, US officials say Iraq and Niger signed an agreement in the summer of 2000 to resume shipments for an additional 500 tons of "yellowcake."
However these officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, say they have never seen any evidence that the transaction was completed.
Niger is a poor, land-locked sub-Saharan country, but it is the world's third-largest uranium producer, after Canada and Australia. Its main uranium mining areas are operated by a French company called Cogema.
US officials say they believe the French operator has good production controls and doubt any uranium materials have disappeared.
But one senior official, speaking on condition of anonymity, says it is possible that someone involved in the mining operation in Niger, possibly corrupt government officials, may have been trying to make some money "on the side" or outsidenormal business transactions.
The current Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, recently told the Security Council his agency has received additional information about Iraq's imports of uranium. He says the IAEA is pursuing the matter and hopes for assistance from what he terms "the African country reported to have been involved." But he did not identify the country nor offer any other details.