In January 1997, the peace process in Angola suffered another setback. UN peacekeeping authorities announced the indefinite delay of the long-awaited inauguration of a new national unity government --- a move that stemmed from ongoing differences between the government of President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos and the rebel movement UNITA, headed by Jonas Savimbi. One of the disappointed foreign diplomats involved in process was US Ambassador Donald Steinberg. In a telephone interview with me, he insisted the delay was not an obstacle to the peace process: Steinberg: I think you can say we are disappointed by the delay that has occurred in the establishment of the government of national unity. This process has been going now for over two years since the signing of the Lusaka protocol in November of 1994, and yet it is not true that this represents an insurmountable obstacle to the peace process. The parties agreed that all of the UNITA members of the new parliament as well as the ministers, vice ministers, and governors and vice governors who will participate in the unity government are to arrive here in Luanda on February 12th and that a new date (for the inauguration) will be established soon thereafter for the establishment of the new government as well as the return of 70 UNITA deputies to the National Assembly.
As you know that will then lead to a process by which the government will very quickly extend its administration throughout the entire national territory, thus ending the situation where part of the country is under the control of the government and part is under control of UNITA.
Belida: Let me ask you right there, Mr. Ambassador, UNITA’s deputies, for example, were supposed to be back in Luanda in January. They did not show up. How confident can you be that UNITA will adhere to this new commitment?
Steinberg: We're doing everything we can to affirm their appearance here on February 12th. The parties have made formal commitments to this new date. Obviously there have been substantial delays in implementing the peace process.
But I think it's also important to remember the progress we have made. Just about two years ago there were a thousand people dying a day in Angola. For much of the last two years and certainly for the year of 1996 there have been no violent deaths from clashes between UNITA and the government. We've already seen the top UNITA generals incorporate into the national army. We’ve seen about five-thousand UNITA troops also incorporate into that army. We have seen the quartering of 60-thousand UNITA troops and we also have 115-thousand UNITA family members at the quartering sites exercising their commitment to the peace process. So i think we have to recognize that after 20 years of civil war there is a lot of mistrust that has to be overcome.
There's a lot of disappointment over the failed peace process of 1991 and 92 and so the notion that the peace process is going off track because of the delays I just think is not valid.
Belida: What were some of main obstacles that you think contributed to this latest delay involving the inauguration?
Steinberg: I think some of them were logistical in the sense we need to have all of the 70 UNITA deputies rounded up and here in Luanda. We need perhaps 160 to 170 UNITA members at the provincial, state, local and federal level here in Luanda. But I also think part of it was due to some remaining issues that have yet to be resolved.
One of the biggest of these is of course the special status that is anticipated for UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in the protocol of Lusaka. It was established that as leader of the largest opposition leader in parliament, Mr. Savimbi would have an important role to play in this process, that he would have direct links with the president and that for the international community, the people of Angola and for the members of the new government as well, there would be a sense that Savimbi is part of the solution and not part of the problem.
Additionally we have some remaining issues to resolve in terms of the extension of government administration throughout the entire country. The methodology for that extension has not yet been agreed to by the parties.
But I think an important commitment that was made last week by UNITA as well the government was that those two issues, however nettlesome they may be, will not delay the arrival of the UNITA deputies and members of the government on February 12th nor will it delay the installation of the new government and the parliament.
Note: The delays continued. The following is from Human Rights Watch:
"In March 1997 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited Angola, originally hoping to be present for the inauguration of the new government of national unity, but this was once more been delayed. In an effort to break the impasse Kofi Annan traveled to Bailundo on March 24 to meet with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. Kofi Annan's visit to Angola did not provide instant results but did stimulate renewed attention to a number of issues, such as the status of Jonas Savimbi, the arrival of UNITA officials in Luanda, and the inauguration of a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN).
On April 9, 1997 the Angolan National Assembly took a major step forward with the swearing in of approximately sixty-three UNITA deputies. Five UNITA deputies who had been participating in the National Assembly since 1992 had earlier been denounced by Savimbi. The National Assembly has since been the scene of some heated debate, the first time since 1992, although votes have been clearly along party lines.
The new Government of National Unity (GURN) was inaugurated on April 11. The leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi was not present at the ceremony, signaling his ambivalence to the government, which included representatives from MPLA, UNITA, and the Democratic Party of Angola (PDA).
The original date for the formation of this government had been January 1997, but this deadline was not met because of technical failures in the negotiations. Critical issues were the quality and quantity of housing for UNITA officials and the tolerable size of their political security force. A second deadline was set for the end of February. This passed, with the status of Jonas Savimbi as the central issue - an issue that remained a key negotiating point, with UNITA looking for the post to have direct military authority. The U.N. in December 1996 sought to divorce the issue of Savimbi's status from the formation of a government of national unity.
The last deadline was in March 1997. This provided the U.N. Security Council with additional time to pressure UNITA to comply with the schedule. It was evident that the U.N. was anxious to make the national unity government effective before its own mandate expired at the end of July and the phased withdrawal of its military forces.
Perhaps because of international pressure and the change of government in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo ), elements of UNITA finally joined the national unity government in April. Parliamentary elections, due to be held in 1996, were postponed for between two and four years under the terms of the Lusaka Protocol, and presidential elections would not be held until the U.N. determined that appropriate conditions existed.
The handover of control of local municipalities to the government was also slow. It began on April 30, 1997, but in May UNITA cited "technical reasons" when challenged over the delay in the handover of fifteen municipalities in Benguela province. Following U.N. and Troika (Russia, Portugal and U.S.) pressure on UNITA, the U.N. announced that the expansion of state administration would recommence on May 26 and Vila Nova, just east of Huambo, was handed over on May 28 to a high-level delegation. A few days later in Quibala district of Cuanza Sul, UNITA supporters protesting the handing over of territory to the government managed to assault and injure Isaias Samakuva, head of the UNITA delegation to the Joint Commission and N'zau Puna, a UNITA defector who had become a vice-minister for the Interior Ministry.
For the rest of 1997 the normalization of state administration in UNITA-controlled areas proceeded at a very slow and uneven pace. The process was again suspended on November 1 but resumed on November 22. By January 8, 1998, central government authority had been established in 239 out of a total of 344 localities for which this was envisaged in the peace plan. State administration had been extended to three strategic areas: Cuango, Mavinga, and Negage.
By May 1 some sixty localities remained in which central authority had not been established, including the UNITA strongholds of Andulo, Bailundo, Nharea, and Mongo. Despite repeated calls by the U.N. for control of these four strongholds to be handed over to the government, UNITA kept dragging its heels with new excuses.
Finally, on July 1, the rebels came under new sanctions, freezing their foreign bank accounts, banning their diamond exports, and preventing all air and water transport into and out of UNITA-held territories. Already on June 6 Savimbi had told his supporters in Bailundo, his stronghold in the central highlands, that U.N. sanctionswould be regarded as an attack on UNITA to which it "was ready to respond." According to the government, UNITA rebels had already acted, seizing fifty-five localities across the country since March. In December 1997, Savimbi and dos Santos spoke on the telephone for the first time in many months. This was followed on January 9, 1998 by an agreement to complete implementation of the key outstanding elements of the Lusaka Protocol."